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AN EXAMINATION OF THE STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE
PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE
INTRODUCTION

Who would a child most likely go to if he or she got into
trouble with the law? Optimally, a child would seek the
guidance of his or her parents.! Recently, "family values" has
been the topic of much discussion.2 Society has become very
1 See In re Application of A and M, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (4th Dep't 1978)
(asserting that I[t]here is nothing more natural, more consistent with our concept of
the parental role, than that a child may rely on his parents for help and advice").
The New York court acknowledged that:
Child psychologists and behavioral scientists generally agree that it is
essential to the parent-child relationship that the lines of communication
remain open and that the child be encouraged to 'talk out' his problems. It
is therefore critical to a child's emotional development that he know that
he may explore his problems in an atmosphere of trust and understanding
without fear that his confidences will later be revealed to others.
Id. at 380 (citing T. LIDZ, THE FAMILY: THE DEVELOPMENTAL SETTING, AMERICAN
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (Arieti ed., 1974)); see also 144 CONG. REC. H2269 (daily
ed. Apr. 23, 1998) (statement of Rep. Nadler) (stating that American parents
encourage their children to confide in them); 144 CONG. REC. H2269 (Apr. 23, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Lofgren) (asserting that "parents spend most of [their] lives"
earning their children's trust); Robert W. Peterson & Gerald F. Uelmen,
Commentary, Starr's Legacy May Include a New Privilege Law: Compelling Monica
Lewinsky's Mother to Testify Has Spawned Calls for Protecting Parent-Child
Communications, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1998, at B9 (recognizing that "[mlost parents
work diligently to maintain an open door for their children, encouraging them to
share even the most embarrassing or incriminating information so that the parents
can provide guidance and advice through the inevitable crises of life").
See 144 CONG. REC. H2270 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1998) ("If we truly respect
family values, we must protect the ability of parents and children to have full trust
in each other and not fear the court's subpoena to get in between them.") (statement
of Rep. Nadler). See, e.g., Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values:
The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 1299, 1316-26 (1997)
(discussing contemporary family law as it relates to heterosexual couples and
speculating its future course); Linda R. Crane, Family Values and the Supreme
Court, 25 CONN. L. REV. 427, 448-54 (1993) (discussing the social issues related to
unwed fathers asserting parental rights); James Donald Moorehead, Of Family
Values and Child Welfare: What Is in the "Best"Interests of the Child?, 79 MARQ. L.
REV. 517, 518-21 (1996) (discussing how society responds to parental abuse and
neglect); Russell G. Pearce, Foreword to Symposium on "Should the Family Be
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concerned with striving to maintain the familial sanctum, yet

the law generally does not protect confidential communications
between parent and child.3 This means that a parent may be
called to testify against his or her child in a civil or criminal
proceeding or, vice versa, a child may be called to testify against
a parent. This occurs more frequently than many realize.'
A number of privileges are recognized under both the
common and statutory laws. The law recognizes a spousal
Represented as an Entity?": Reexamining the Family Values of Legal Ethics, 22
SEATrLE U. L. REv. 1 (1998) (discussing the pros and cons of legal representation of
families as single entities); Suzanne Carol Schuelke, Prison Visitation and Family
Values, 77 MICH. B.J. 160, 163-64 (1998) (discussing how visits from family
members and preserving family bonds diminishes the chances that inmates will
return to prison).
Supporting "family values" is also a popular political stance to take these days.
See, e.g., Clinton Makes a Play for Family Values, DAILY MAIL, Jan. 21, 1999, at 4
(suggesting that President Clinton's proposal concerning tax credits for parents
staying home to take care of their children and a patients bill of rights boosts his
popularity ratings); Chris Murphy, The Race for Congress: Ron Greer Touts His
Family Values, WIs. ST. J., Sept. 1, 1998, at 2A (discussing 1998 Wisconsin
Congressional candidate, Ron Greer, and his prevalent use of "family values" issues
in his campaign); Andrea Peyser, Bill's Wife Turns Family Values Inside Out, N.Y.
POST, Sept. 24, 1998, at 16 (suggesting that Hillary Clinton lectures on family
values for the sole reason of effectuating her political programs).
' See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Unemancipated Minor Child), 949 F. Supp.
1487, 1495 (E.D. Wash. 1996) ("[Ifn light of this society's increasing concern with
the weakening of the family structure, such communication and parental guidance
should be encouraged, not discouraged, by the judiciary."). District Judge Claiborne
recognized this paradox when he stated:
To damage the parent-child relationship would result in damage to the
child's relationship to society as a whole. In an age in which Americans
bemoan the lack of loyalty or sense of responsibility which some family
members seem to exhibit toward one another, resulting in massive
government support programs, it is paradoxical that, on the other hand,
the government would seek to employ information-gathering tactics which
further undermine the integrity and supportive structure of the family
unit.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings Witness: Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Nev.
1983).
4 See generally Doug Most, A Court Has
Ears Inside the Home. Parent-Child
Secrets Not Safe, RECORD, Dec. 7, 1997, at A01 (discussing how the parents of Amy
Grossberg fought subpoenas by Delaware prosecutors); Need for Parent/Child
Privilege, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, CHAMPION, Apr. 1998,
at 11 ("At no time before has the need for a 'parent-child privilege' been so clear as
when America... saw Marcia Lewis visibly shaken and trembling after her ordeal
before the Washington grand jury convened by Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr.") (quoting Gerald B. Lefcourt); Barry Siegel, Choosing Between Their Son and
the Law, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1996, at Al (discussing how parents were held in
contempt of court for refusing to testify against their son who had confessed
committing a rape to them).

PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE

privilege,5 an attorney-client privilege,6 a doctor-patient
privilege, 7 a priest-penitent privilege,8 a psychotherapist-patient
privilege, 9 and a reporter-source privilege."0 The policy concerns
justifying these widely accepted privileges are just as important
in the parent-child context." The law holds parents responsible
for the caring of their children in all aspects of their lives. 2
" See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (modifying spousal privilege to
"further[] the important public interest in marital harmony") (quoting Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1979)).
6 See UpJohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (asserting that the
privilege's "purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice").
' See 3 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 514.01(1) (2d ed. 1998) (stating that
the privilege encourages "full and frank disclosure by patients to facilitate proper
medical treatment"). No physician-patient privilege was recognized under federal
common law. See id. § 514.02. But, the majority of the states recognize the privilege.
See id. § 514.11. Federal courts may recognize the privilege in accordance with state
law or under the lawyer-client or psychotherapist-patient privilege. See id. § 514.03.
The privilege may also be recognized under a constitutional right to privacy
analysis. See id. § 514.05.
See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (stating that "privileges between priest and
penitent.., are rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust"); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (stating that "generally... a priest may
not be required to disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence"); see
also 3 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 7, § 506.03(2) (noting that the
rationale behind the privilege is that "[ciivilized society presumes that a
communication made in reasonable confidence that it will not be disclosed will be
protected").
This privilege had its origin in the Roman Catholic Canon Law. See Michael J.
Mazza, Should Clergy Hold the Priest-PenitentPrivilege?, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 171,
174-75 (1998) (explaining how papal order at the end of the ninth and thirteenth
centuries barred priests from disclosing the sins heard during confession and
warning that if such a disclosure was made the priest would be stripped of his
status).
See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51) (asserting that
the "psychotherapist-patient privilege is 'rooted in the imperative need for
confidence and trust' ").
20 See
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN
EVIDENCE-DOCTRINE & PRACTICE, § 5.40 (1995) (stating that the privilege has
been widely adopted by the states and many federal courts recognize the privilege).
The rationale underlying the privilege is that if it were not recognized, "the
newsgathering function would be impaired." Id.
" The analogies that can be drawn between these legally recognizable
privileges and the parent-child privilege will be addressed throughout this Note.
2 See Richard C. Burke & Anna Maria Maxwell, Annual Survey of South
Carolina Law, 48 S.C. L. REV. 107, 115-22 (1996) (discussing the West Virginia
primary caretaker doctrine in domestic relations cases); Felicia C. Strankman,
Comment, Children'sMedical Care in California:Conflicts Between Parent, Child,
and State, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 899, 900-25 (1996) (discussing legal reaction to
parental refusal of medical care for their children); see also Carl E. Schneider, On
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Courts have consistently found that parents have a duty to3
provide their children with maintenance, care, and guidance.
Furthermore, as criminal penalties become harsher and courts
are less-forgiving of juvenile offenders, children are more likely
to need the guidance and care of their parents." It is important
to recognize that "when a minor is arrested for a crime, it is only
natural that, in the first instance, he should regard his parents,
rather than a lawyer, as a source of assistance and advice." 5
The majority of state and federal courts do not recognize a
parent-child testimonial privilege protecting confidential
communications made between children and their parents."
the Duties and Rights of Parents, 81 VA. L. REV. 2477, 2486 (1995) (noting that
contemporary family law values childrens' interests over those of the parent);
Chadwick N. Gardner, Note, Don't Come Cryin' to Daddy! Emancipationof Minors:
When is a Parent 'Free at Last' From the Obligation of Child Support, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 927, 928-30 (1995) (discussing child emancipation suits). But
see Terrance A. Kline, Note, Clifford Trusts and the Parental Duty to Provide a
College Education: Braun v. Commissioner, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 537, 546-54 (1985)
(recognizing that no state court imposes a duty on married parents to provide for
their children's college education); Donna K. LeClair, Comment, Faith-Healingand
Religious-Treatment Exemptions to Child-Endangerment Laws: Should Parental
Religious Practices Excuse the Failure to Provide Necessary Medical Care to
Children?, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 79 (1987) (analyzing state statute exemptions
which provide immunity from criminal liability to parents who refuse medical
treatment for their children based upon religious beliefs).
's See Ascuitto v. Farricelli, 711 A.2d 708, 713 (Conn. 1998) (stating that the
duty of a parent to provide guidance for their child does not end with divorce);
Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic, Inc., 355 N.Y.S.2d 432, 434 (2d Dep't 1974)
(noting that parents owe a moral duty to their children to provide care,
maintenance, and guidance); Boehm v. C.M. Gridley & Sons, 63 N.Y.S.2d 587, 592
(Sup. Ct. 1946) (same); In re O'Donnell, 61 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824 (Child. Ct. New York
County 1946) (sentencing a parent to three months in warehouse for her neglect and
failure to provide children with spiritual guidance); In re Fujimoto's Guardianship,
226 P. 505, 506 (Wash. 1924) (stating that minors are entitled to guidance and care
from their parents, irrespective of the parent's nationality).
14 See Wayne A. Logan, Proportionalityand Punishment: Imposing Life Without
Paroleon Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 683 (1998) (noting that "juvenile
offenders are now being prosecuted and punished as adults like never before"). See
generally Paula R. Brummel, Doing Adult Time for Juvenile Crime: When the
Charge,Not the Conviction, Spells Prison for Kids, 16 LAw AND INEQALITY 541, 546
(1998) (observing that 38 states have waivers which provide for trying juveniles as
adults); Elisabeth Gasparini, Juvenile Capital Punishment: A Spectacle of a Child's
Injustice, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1073, 1081 n.74 (1998) (stating that by August 18, 1997,
58 juvenile offenders were on death row).
'5 People v. Harreli, 450 N.Y.S.2d 501, 503 (2d Dep't 1982), affd, 449 N.E.2d
1263 (N.Y. 1983); see also People v. Burton, 491 P.2d 793, 798 (Cal. 1971) (asserting
that it is "common knowledge" that a child who is in trouble with the law will call
his parents before calling an attorney).
16 The various courts' treatment of the parent-child testimonial privilege will be
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Conversely, legal scholars have consistently argued for the
adoption of a parent-child privilege based on a variety of legal
theories, 7 sometimes looking to history to bolster their
arguments. The English common law never recognized a parentchild testimonial privilege. 8 Scottish law, on the other hand,
held that a parent could not be compelled to testify against his or
her child. The parent-child privilege is also currently recognized
in France, Sweden, Germany, Yugoslavia, Israel, and

addressed throughout this Note.
17 See, e.g., Yoland L. Ayala & Thomas C. Martyn, Note, To Tell or Not To Tell?
An Analysis of Testimonial Privileges: The Parent-Childand Reporter's Privileges, 9
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 163, 175-80 (1993) (reviewing arguments based on
the right of privacy, and policy concerns regarding family unity); Jeffrey Begens,
Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: An Absolute Right or an Absolute
Privilege?, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 709, 717-29 (1986) (asserting policy and right of
privacy bases); Betsy Booth, Comment, Underprivileged Communications: The
Rationale for a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 36 Sw. L.J. 1175, 1176-86
(1983) (discussing the Wigmore standard, pro-family policy concerns, and right of
privacy considerations); Jennifer A. Clark, Note, Questioning the Recognition of a
Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 45 ALB. L. REV. 142, (1980) (contemplating
various policy justifications for the privilege); Daniel R. Coburn, Child-Parent
Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DICK- L. REV. 599,
613-32 (1969) (suggesting miscellaneous policy justifications); J. Tyson Covey, Note,
Making Form Follow Function: Considerations in Creating and Applying a
Statutory Parent-ChildPrivilege, U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 886-91 (1990) (calling for the
privilege on policy grounds, including protections of a child's reasonable
expectations of privacy, and avoidance of turning family member against family
member in a criminal trial); Gregory W. Franklin, Note, The Judicial Development
of the Parent-ChildTestimonial Privilege: Too Big for its Britches?, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 145, 151-54, 166-75 (1984) (justifying the parent-child privilege based on
its consistency with Wigmore's well-known elements of privilege); Note, ParentChild Loyalty & Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910, 915-25 (1987)
(justifying the privilege on the loyalty which is native to the parent-child
relationship); Nissa M. Ricafort, Note, Jaffee v. Redmond: The Supreme Court's
Dramatic Shift Supports the Recognition of a Federal Parent-Child Privilege, 32
IND. L. REV. 259, 273-80 (1998) (discussing privilege rationales of right of privacy,
free exercise of religion, and the broad construction of the federal rules of evidence);
David A. Schlueter, The Parent-ChildPrivilege:A Response to Calls for Adoption, 19
ST. MARY's L.J. 35, 37-57 (1987) (reviewing the Wigmore elements, right of privacy,
and freedom of religion as potential justifications for the privilege); Wendy Meredith
Watts, The Parent-ChildPrivileges:Hardlya New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 583, 600-13 (1987) (discussing justifications based on family
autonomy, the right to privacy, and expansive readings of the federal rules of
evidence). But see Jessica L. Perry, Parent-ChildPrivilege, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L.
142, 144-48 (1997-98) (explaining how the Third Circuit declined to accept the
existence of a parent-child privilege based on Federal Rule of Evidence 501).
18 See 25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5572 (1989). The civil law recognizes a parent-child
testimonial privilege, as does Louisiana. See id.
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Czechoslovakia. 9 It is interesting to note that "[b]oth ancient
Jewish law and Roman law entirely barred family members from
testifying against each other, based on a desire to promote the
solidarity and trust that support the family unit."20 The Roman
Catholic church has also recognized the privilege under Canon
Law.2
Recently, the Bill Clinton/Monica Lewinsky scandal brought
the parent-child privilege into the spotlight, specifically because
of the strong public response to Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr's subpoena of Monica Lewinsky's mother to testify before
the grand jury.22 This investigation brought mainstream
attention to the issue unlike ever before, calling for a review of
the protection afforded to parent-child communications.
This Note asserts that the parent-child testimonial privilege
should become pervasive law in the United States. This Note
will also address arguments that have been made which weigh
19See id.
20

21

Covey, supra note 17, at 883.
See Parent-ChildLoyalty and Testimonial Privilege, supra note 17, at 929

n.12.
2 See 144 CONG. REC. H2270 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Nadler) (arguing for the adoption of an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Evidence); Laurie Asseo, Some Thought it a Disturbing Sight-Monica...,
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Feb. 17, 1998 (noting how it was a disturbing sight
to see Monica Lewinsky's mother crying after testifying against her daughter);
Daniel J. Capra, Laws of Evidentiary Privilege, N.Y. L.J., May 8, 1998, at 3 (noting
that [t] he absence of any parent-child privilege became a matter of public and
political outcry"); David Espo & Larry Margasak, President Misused Power, Starr
Says, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 19, 1998, at Al (reiterating the statement of Rep. John
Conyers in which he said "[iut is not acceptable to force mothers to testify against
their daughters"); John Gibson, Analysis: Ethics of Making Parents Testify Against
Their Children in Criminal Matters, INTERNIGHT, Apr. 9, 1998 (MSNBC 1998),
available in 1998 WL 6633390 (discussing John Cook's dilemma when he was forced
to testify against his son); Peterson & Uelmen, supra note 1 (comparing Starr's
legacy in relation to the parent-child privilege with the Watergate era and the
journalistic privilege); PrivilegedFew?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 2, 1998, at A22 (recognizing
that "[wihen Marcia Lewis, Ms. Lewinsky's mother, left the grand jury room
trembling, many reacted with abhorrence at the idea of a mother being forced to
testify against her daughter"); David E. Rovella, One Starr Subpoena Awakens the
Defense Bar, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 2, 1998, at A10 (noting how Kenneth Starr's subpoena
of Ms. Lewis to testify against her daughter is a legal oddity that only occurs in
heinous crimes); see also Jonathan S. Shapiro, Parent-ChildRelationship Doesn't
Deserve Privilege, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 20, 1998, at N21 (noting that although
Monica Lewinsky's attorney might not think it is fair to have a mother testify
against her daughter, it is not prohibited by law). See generally W. John Moore &
Louis Jacobson, Lobbying & Law, NATL J., May 30, 1998 (discussing how Starr's
tactics have helped the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
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against adoption of the privilege. Part I of this Note examines.
the statutory and common laws of the various states with regard
to the parent-child privilege. Part II examines treatment of the
privilege under Federal law.
Part III outlines various
constitutional justifications in support of the parent-child
privilege such as the right to privacy and freedom of religion
issues.
I. STATE LAW

A. Statutory Law
The majority of states have not instituted statutory law
recognizing a parent-child privilege.
Only Idaho' and
Minnesota' have instituted a one-way parent-child privilege in
statutory form protecting communications made by a minor child
to his or her parents. These statutes generally provide for the
abrogation of this privilege when there is a possibility that a
child has been injured or neglected by his or her parent. 25
The Minnesota statute further recognizes that the
communication will be considered confidential even if it is
communicated in front of another member of the child's
immediate family.28 The parent-child privilege, however, can be
voluntarily waived or will be deemed waived if it is not raised by
the parent or the child at the time information regarding the
confidential communication is sought.7
Additionally, a Massachusetts statute recognizes a one-way
privilege which provides that a minor child cannot testify
2' See IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (7) (Michie 1998) (stating that '[alny parent,
guardian or legal custodian shall not be forced to disclose any communication made
by their minor child or ward to them concerning matters in any civil or criminal
action to which such child or ward is a party").
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (j) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that "[a] parent
or the parent's minor child may not be examined as to any communication made in
confidence by the minor to the minor's parent").
25 See IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (7) (Michie 1998) (noting that
the parent-child
privilege will not apply to a case of physical injury to a child where the injury has
been caused by a parent, guardian, or legal custodian); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02
(j) (West Supp. 1999) (recognizing various criminal and civil actions as exempted
from the privilege, such as crimes committed by the parent upon the child and
parental rights proceedings).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (j) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that [a]
communication is confidential if made out of the presence of persons not members of
the child's immediate family living in the same household").
27 See id.
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against a parent with whom the child resides.'

The privilege

only applies, however, if the victim is not a member of the
parent's family and does not reside in the child's household.29
Various organizations are urging Congress and the other
states to follow the lead of Idaho, Minnesota, and Massachusetts
in adopting a parent-child privilege. The National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers is currently lobbying for Congress
and state legislatures to adopt its version of a proposed parentchild privilege statute. 30 Further, the American Bar Association
has formed a committee which has drafted a model statute
recognizing the parent-child testimonial privilege.31
B. Common Law
New York is the only state that recognizes a common law
parent-child testimonial privilege. 32 In In re Application of A
and M, 33 the District Attorney sought to compel the parents of a

sixteen year old boy to testify to admissions he made to his
parents regarding a fire that was set.3 ' The court adopted a
28 See

MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 233 § 20 (Law Co-op Supp. 1998) (stating that "[a]n

unemancipated, minor child, living with a parent, shall not testify before a grand
jury, trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against said
parent").
29 See id.
3o See CHAMPION, supra note 4, at 11. A portion of the proposed statute would
state the following.
No parent, guardian or legal custodian shall be compelled to testify or
disclose any communication made in confidence by a child to the parent,
guardian or legal custodian, absent an explicit waiver by the child, in any
administrative, civil or criminal action or grand jury proceeding other than
an action relating to alleged violence or sexual abuse against the child.
Id. at 10.
3' For a copy of the American Bar Association's Model Parent-Child Privilege
Statute §§ 101-04 see Watts, supra note 17 at 619-31 and 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 18. The proposed statute would cover only children who have not reached
the age of majority and would protect parents and children from testifying about
confidential communications made between the parties. See MODEL PARENT CHILD
PRIVILEGE STAT. §§ 101(b), 102-03. There are some exceptions where the privilege
would not attach, for example, if the parent and child are opposing parties. See id. §
103(d).
2 See, e.g., People v. Harrell, 450 N.Y.S.2d 501, 505 (2d Dep't 1982) (upholding
the privilege for a 17 year old's in-custody communications to his mother), af/'d, 449
N.E.2d 1263 (N.Y. 1983); In re Ryan, 474 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Fam. Ct. Monroe County
1984) (refusing to admit statements made by a juvenile to his grandmother); People
v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 (Westchester County Ct. 1979) (discussing the
application and upholding the validity of the parent-child privilege).
3' 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (4th Dep't 1978).
Id. at 377.
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parent-child privilege and accepted the argument that the boy
spoke to his parents while seeking guidance within the privacy of
the family home, and expected the communications to be held in
3
confidence.&
The court based its holding on the theory of a constitutional
right to family privacy.36 The Appellate Division recognized that
"communications made by a minor child to his parents within
the context of the family relationship may, under some
circumstances, lie within the 'private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter.' "3 The court further asserted:
Surely the thought of the State forcing a mother and father to
reveal their child's alleged misdeeds, as confessed to them in
private, to provide the basis for criminal charges is shocking to
our sense of decency, fairness and propriety. It is inconsistent
with the way of life we cherish and guard so carefully and
raises the specter of a regime which encourages betrayal of
one's offspring. 8
The court also recognized the inherent danger that the
"public trust in our system of justice" would be diminished if
parents who refuse to testify against their children were sent to
jail for contempt or perjury. 3s Upon balancing these important
interests against the state's legitimate fact-finding interests, the
court concluded that the state's interests were not compelling
enough to overcome the privilege. 0
The validity of the common law parent-child testimonial
privilege was upheld in People v. Fitzgerald.1 In Fitzgerald,the
court declared that the existence of a parent-child privilege was
"grounded in law, logic, morality and ethics." 2 The court also
"5 See id. The court acknowledged, however, that there was an absence of
factual findings with regard to the circumstances under which the admissions were
communicated. See id.
86 See infra Part III and accompanying footnotes for a discussion of
constitutional considerations addressed by various federal courts.
Application of A and M, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). The court refused to extend the marital
privilege to cover this communication. See id. at 377. The court also declined to
extend the attorney-client privilege, even though the boy's father was an attorney.
See id. at 377-78.

3" Id. at 380.
s9 Id.

40 See id. at 381 (concluding that a protected communication privilege exists for
statements made by a child to his parents).
4' 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979).
42 Id.
at 310. But see People v. Johnson, 644 N.E.2d 1378, 1379 (N.Y. 1994)
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based the privilege's validity on the constitutional right to
privacy within the family. 3 In Fitzgerald, a twenty-three year
old made admissions to his father concerning a hit and run car
accident." The court, in refusing to force the father to testify
about what his son had told him, recognized the important
interest underlying the privilege in protecting the integrity of
the parent-child relationship.'
It is important to note that the Fitzgeraldcourt did not limit
the privilege to minor children. The court asserted that the
mutual trust and understanding that exists between a parent
and child cannot be intruded upon by the State because of an age
barrier." Recently, however, the New York Court of Appeals and
at least one lower court have refused to apply the privilege to
admissions made by twenty-eight year old defendants."
48 a New York Supreme Court declined
In People v. Hilligas,
to recognize a parent-child privilege to cover communications
made by an adult defendant. The court reasoned that the nature
of the parent-child relationship changes when the child becomes
an adult and, as a result, the State's interest outweighs the
privacy interests involved.49 The court stated that "[tihe adult
child is more likely to seek advice and guidance from persons
other than their parents.8 ° In some situations "[tihe role of the
parent as advisor and counselor... is diminished" 1 when the
child becomes an adult. The court apparently overlooked the
fact that often the role of the parent as advisor increases.
Logically, a person may be more willing to communicate with a
(mem.) (affirming the denial of a parent-child privilege where the child was 28 years
old); People v. Hilligas, 670 N.Y.S.2d 744, 747 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (denying the use of
the parent-child privilege once the child has reached adulthood).
Fitzgerald,422 N.Y.S.2d at 312 (finding that a parent-child privilege stems
from a right to privacy granted by the Constitution).
" See id. at 310 (discussing defendant's admission to his father while alone).
4See
id.
" See id. at 313-14 ("The parent-child relationship of mutual trust, respect and
confidence, if it exists at all in the individual case, is one that should be and must be
fostered throughout the life of the parties.").
41 See Johnson, 644 N.E.2d at 1379 (refusing to apply privilege to admissions
made by a 28 year old child); Hilligas, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 747 (denying use of the
parent-child privilege for an adult defendant).
670 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1998).
49 See id. at 747 (denying the application
of the parent-child privilege upon
finding the parent-child relationship to diminish when the child reaches adulthood).
50 Id. (stating that adult children will more likely seek advice from attorneys,
clerk, psychologists, and siblings).
Id.
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parent as he or she gets older because the person's fear of
discipline is significantly diminished. The person may feel more
comfortable discussing experiences with his or her parents which
were inappropriate to discuss when he or she was younger.
Adults often need the advice and guidance of their parents more
so than children.
The New York courts have seemingly further limited the
application of the parent-child privilege under certain
circumstances. In People v. Johnson," the New York Court of
Appeals refused to recognize the parent-child privilege because
the defendant was twenty-eight years old, another family
member was present when the communication was made, and
the child's mother had previously testified to the grand jury."
Thus, Johnson calls Fitzgerald's validity into question because
their facts are similar. In both cases, the defendant was an
adult and the parent had previously testified to communications
which they wanted protected. Moreover, the Fitzgerald Court
stated that the privilege cannot be waived by a prior disclosure
of the confidential communication by the parent.' Johnson is
distinguishable because there is arguably no familial privilege
generally protecting communications between family members,
and the communication was not confidential because a third
party was present when it was made." This appears to be a
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See, e.g., Johnson, 644 N.E.2d at 1379 (denying application of the parent-

child privilege where the child wishing to assert it was an adult); People v. Major,
675 N.Y.S.2d 260 (4th Dep't 1998) (rejecting defendant's claim of parent-child
privilege); In re Terrance W., 674 N.Y.S.2d 529 (4th Dep't 1998) (mem.) (same); In re
Mark G., 410 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465-66 (4th Dep't 1978) (mem.) (finding no parent-child
privilege where the statement was not made in confidence); Hilligas, 670 N.Y.S.2d
at 747 (declining to apply the parent-child privilege); People v. Romer, 579 N.Y.S.2d
306, 308 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (finding no parent-child privilege where communication
was made by a parent to a child); Berggren v. Reilly, 407 N.Y.S.2d 960, 962 (Sup.
Ct. 1978) (mem.) (finding "no privilege recognized in law for a conversation between
a parent and his child").
644 N.E.2d 1378 (N.Y. 1994) (mem.).
See idL at 1379 (finding the parent-child privilege inapplicable).
See People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 316 (Westchester County Ct.
1979) (finding no waiver of the parent-child privilege under such circumstances).
There may be a waiver, however, if it is in the best interests of the child because the
court is seeking to maintain the familial relationship. The court uses an example
where its assistance is needed by the parents in order to control the child's behavior.
See id at 315 (citing occasions where the parent would not want to disclose
information).
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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valid distinction because in In re Mark G.," the New York
Appellate Division held that the parent-child privilege would not
attach to communications that were neither made in confidence
nor for the purpose of obtaining guidance."
Under New York common law, the parent-child privilege is
generally limited to protecting communications that are made by
the child to the parent. In People v. Romer,59 the court found
that a communication made by a father to his son was not
protected because parents generally do not seek guidance from
their children.'
The court asserted that the purpose of the
parent-child privilege under Fitzgeraldwas to protect the child's
ability to disclose information to his parents without fear that
the communication would be later revealed through testimony in
court."' As a result, the court in Romer declined to apply the
parent-child privilege to a letter written by a father to his son.62
The majority of states addressing the issue of whether a
common law parent-child testimonial privilege exists have
declined to recognize it.' The most common argument asserted
410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (4th Dep't 1978) (mem.).
'a See id. at 465-66 (finding no privilege where there is no wish for the
communication to be held in confidence).
59 579 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct.
1991).
60See id. at 308 (concluding that the parent-child privilege does not exist where
the communication is from parent to child).
61 See id. (distinguishing the case from Fitzgerald).
See id. (finding the communication was not covered by the parent-child
privilege).
See Stewart v. Superior Ct., 787 P.2d 126, 128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (noting
that the weight of authority is against recognizing the privilege); In re Terry W., 130
Cal. Rptr. 913, 913-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (refusing to recognize parent-child
privilege); People v. Agado, 964 P.2d 565, 568 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied,
1998 Colo. LEXIS 715 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (declining to adopt a parent-child
privilege because testimonial privileges are strictly construed); Marshall v.
Anderson, 459 So. 2d 384, 386 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that a parentchild privilege has not been adopted); People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1245-46
(Ill. 1983) (refusing to recognize the privilege and failing to address constitutional
considerations finding a waiver of the parent-child privilege); Gibbs v. State, 426
N.E.2d 1150, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (deeming the issue waived since defendants
failed to cite any authority to support privilege protecting communications from
parent to child); Cissna v. State, 352 N.E.2d 793, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (refusing
to recognize the privilege in the absence of authority cited by defendant child); State
v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513, 518 (Iowa 1981) (declining to create a parent-child
testimonial privilege); State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Me. 1987) (finding
that no right to privacy is "substantially impaired by a court's refusal to cast a veil
of confidentiality around conversations between a parent and a child"); Three
Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1208 (Mass. 1983) (refusing to
recognize a privilege covering communications made by a father to his children);
57
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by these courts is that it is the legislature's role, rather than the
judiciary's, to create a parent-child privilege."
A privilege
addressing communications between parent and child involves
carefully balancing the individual and governmental interests
involved, which these courts have concluded is the role of the
legislature.'
Some state courts have refused to recognize the parent-child
People v. Amos, 414 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (declining to adopt the
privilege in the absence of statutory or persuasive authority); People v. Dixon, 411
N.W.2d 760, 763 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (asserting that adoption of the privilege is
best left to the legislature); Cabello v. State, 471 So. 2d 332, 340 (Miss. 1985)
(declining to recognize a parent-child privilege on the particular facts and
circumstances of the case); State v. Bruce, 655 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(refusing to recognize parent-child privilege); In re Gail D., 525 A.2d 337, 340 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (finding that the adoption of a parent-child privilege is
best left to the legisature); In re Diana Hawkins, No. C.A.3430, 1983 WL 4091, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. May 11, 1983) (declining to adopt a parent-child privilege); In re
Frances J., 456 A.2d 1174, 1178 (R.I. 1983) (refusing to consider adoption of
privilege to facts and circumstances of particular case); State v. Good, 417 S.E.2d
643, 644 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to protect communications made to an
infant's guardian ad litem); DeLeon v. State, 684 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (refusing to recognize parent-child privilege to prevent a child from testifying
in a proceeding involving a parent); In re Inquest Proceedings, 676 A.2d 790, 794
(Vt. 1996) (declining to create a parent-child privilege to communications made by a
competent adult child); State v. Maxon, 756 P.2d 1297, 1303 (Wash. 1988) (declining
to recognize a parent-child privilege); see also supra notes 47-62 and accompanying
text discussing New York cases which have limited the parent-child testimonial
privilege.
Generally, courts do not recognize communications made between siblings as
privileged. See State v. Wright, 378 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (finding
"no authority establishing a privilege for sibling communications"); Willoughby, 532
A.2d at 1022 (holding that neither the state nor the federal constitution recognizes
an intra-familial privilege).
See, e.g., In re Terry, 787 Cal. Rptr. at 915 (stating that the legislature is the
best forum to decide who should own the privilege, whether it is waivable, and what
exceptions should exist); Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d at 518 (refusing to recognize privilege
absent statutory authority); Three Juveniles, 455 N.E.2d at 1205-06 (asserting that
courts in recent years have "tended to leave the creation of evidentiary privileges to
legislative determination"); Dixon, 411 N.W.2d at 763 (basing its rejection of the
privilege on the premise that adoption should be up to the legislature); Bruce, 655
S.W.2d at 68 (declining to follow Fitzgerald and concluding that the creation of a
parent-child privilege is not a matter for the courts); In re Gail D., 525 A.2d at 339
(deferring to the legislature while acknowledging their power to create a parentchild testimonial privilege); Good, 417 S.E.2d at 645 (stating that courts are
reluctant to create privilege without legislative direction).
See Sanders, 457 N.E.2d at 1245 ("The expansion of existing testimonial
privileges and acceptance of new ones involves a balancing of public policies which
should be left to the legislature."); see also Three Juveniles, 455 N.E.2d at 1207-08
(finding that the state's interest in obtaining all relevant information must
predominate over generalizations favoring the preservation of the family).
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privilege when it is based on a constitutional right to privacy
argument."
In State v. Willoughby,6 7 the Maine Supreme

Judicial Court upheld contempt citations against parents who
refused to testify against their son at his murder trial." The
court reasoned that "[an order to testify in court... in no way
directly regulates conduct essential to family life.' 9 The court
found that the right to privacy would not be substantially
impaired by its refusal to apply a familial privilege. ° In In re
Diana Hawkins,7 the Ohio Court of Appeals asserted that intrafamilial communications are not protected under a penumbral
right of privacy analysis.72 The court concluded the right to
privacy found in Griswold v. Connecticut73 is limited to the
marital relationship. 74
Another argument advanced in declining to apply the
parent-child privilege is that "the creation of new privileges are
disfavored." 75 Other courts refuse to recognize the parent-child
privilege on the ground that "[tiestimonial privileges are not
lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in

derogation of the search for truth.""

This argument arises

See Willoughby, 532 A.2d at 1021 (holding that the United States and Maine
Constitutions do not recognize the parent-child privilege); Inquest Proceedings,676
A.2d at 793-94 (asserting that even if a fundamental right exists, the state's
"interest in the... fact-finding process is sufficiently compelling" to outweigh any
familial privacy interest) (citing Maxon, 756 P.2d at 1301, quoting Donald Cofer,
Comment, Parent-ChildPrivilege: Constitutional Right or Specious Analogy?, 3 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 177, 210-11); Maxon, 756 P.2d at 1300 (holding that the
familial right of privacy does not extend to confidential communications made
between parents and their children); see also Part IH, infra notes 143-60 and
accompanying text discussing constitutional considerations applicable to the
recognition of the parent-child testimonial privilege).
" 532 A.2d 1021 (Me. 1897).
68See id. at 1026 (affirming a contempt judgment against parents who refused
to answer the prosecutor's questions).
Id. at 1023.
70 See id. (finding no "intrafamily testimonial privilege in the Supreme Court's
privacy decisions").
71 1983 WL 4091, at *1 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. May
11, 1983).
" See id. at *2-3 (finding that the right to privacy does not create a parentchild privilege).
8 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
74 See Hawkins, 1983 WL 4091 at *2-3 (finding no absolute right to a privilege).
75 Gibbs v. State, 426 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (disfavoring the
creation of new privileges and noting that the defendants in the case had cited "no
authority, binding or persuasive, ancient or modem, in common or civil law, to
support such a privilege").
6 People v. Agado, 964 P.2d 565, 568 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998)
(citing United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974)); see also People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241,
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mostly in federal cases and will be addressed in the next
section."
Although a majority of the states have declined to recognize
the parent-child testimonial privilege, some states have left the
door open for its adoption. 78 For example, in State v. Gilroy79 the

Iowa Supreme Court refused to adopt the privilege absent
statutory authority.' Although the court in Gilroy did not adopt
a parent-child privilege, it did acknowledge Fitzgerald8 ' and
distinguished it because the communications between the father
and his daughter in Gilroy were not confidential.'
In Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth,' the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts distinguished the case sub judice from
the typical parent-child privilege situation, reasoning different
policy considerations are relevant when a child is called to testify
against a parent." The court declined to adopt a parent-child
1245 (Ill. 1983) (asserting that "evidentiary privileges of this sort exclude relevant
evidence and thus work against the truthseeking function of legal proceedings");
State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020, 1022 (Me. 1987) (noting that "the Supreme
Court has strictly construed testimonial privileges"); Three Juveniles v.
Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (Mass. 1983) (recognizing "the fundamental
principle that 'the public.., has a right to every man's evidence'" (quoting United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)) (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed.)
2192, at 64)); People v. Dixon, 411 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that "the exclusion of a parent's or a child's testimony would [not] promote
'sufficiently important interests' so as 'to outweigh the need for probative evidence
in the administration of criminal justice'") (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 51 (1980)); see also In re Gail D., 525 A.2d 337, 339-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987) (acknowledging the need for compelling reasons to create privileges since
they "do not further the ascertainment of truth but rather permit concealment of
relevant, reliable information").
77 See generally Part H, infra notes 93-142 and accompanying text.
78 See Cabello v. State, 471 So. 2d 332, 340 (Miss. 1985) (stating that for the
privilege to be recognized, it needs to be mutually asserted and "largely directed to
the confidences a son or daughter might reveal to a parent in expectation of
guidance through counseling or moral support"). But see State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d
513, 518 (Iowa 1981) (declining to adopt a parent-child privilege absent statutory
authority); Three Juveniles, 455 N.E.2d at 1206 (refusing to adopt a parent-child
privilege where communication is made from parent to child, due to lack of support
from case law and the legislature).
313 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1981).
' See id. at 518.
81 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the New
York case.
See Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d at 518 (distinguishing Fitzgerald because Gilray
concerned testimony as to a parent's actions rather than confidential
communications which could "be placed under such privilege").
455 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1983).
See id. at 1206.
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privilege, finding the need in protecting such a communication
weaker because "a parent does not need the advice of a minor
child in the same sense that a child may need the advice of a
parent.'
Three justices, including Chief Justice Hennessey,
dissented in this case.'
The dissenters disagreed with the
majority's balancing analysis, which consisted of weighing "the
public's interest in obtaining every person's testimony against
public policy considerations in favor of erecting a testimonial
privilege." 7 Instead, the dissenters argued:
The violence done to the child, the damage to family unity, and
the consequent injury to society that may result from the
State's coercing an unemancipated minor to testify against a
parent in the circumstances of this case are too high a price to
pay for the enforcement of our criminal laws.M
The Vermont Supreme Court, in In re Inquest Proceedings,9
refused to adopt a parent-child privilege, yet found it important
to distinguish between competent adult defendants and
children.'
The court recognized that special circumstances exist
when minors or incompetent adults are involved in certain
proceedings, but found the adult in this case to be competent."
The court asserted that "[tihe relationship between an adult
child and a parent is not one requiring confidentiality for its full
and satisfactory maintenance.'
Id. at 1206. The court recognized that while some courts supported a
privilege for communications by a child to a parent, no state acknowledged such a
privilege for the converse situation. See id. at 1206 n.4, 1206-07. Nonetheless, the
court in Three Juveniles did not have to decide the issue of whether such privilege
exists. See id. at 1206 (stating that "the case before us does not currently involve...
the question of confidential communications between parent and child"). Instead the
court focused on "what the children may have seen and heard in nonconfidential
circumstances." Id. at 1207. The court determined that "[cionfidential
communications aside, [there is] no basis for concluding that a constitutional right
of privacy requires that the children and their parents be given a testimonial
privilege." Id.
See id. at 1208.
87 Id. at 1207.
8 Id. at 1208. The dissent further asserted that 'Islociety's interest in its
children should be recognized as sufficiently important to outweigh the need for
probative evidence in the administration of criminal justice in the circumstances
presented by this case." Id. at 1209.
676 A.2d 790 (Vt. 1996).
go See id. at 793.

01 See id. (referring to criminal delinquency proceedings). The court found that
although the adult son may have had learning disabilities, he was not incompetent.
See id.
, Id.
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II. FEDERAL LAW
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a
privilege "shall be governed by the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience." 3 Rule 501 further provides
that privileges shall be determined in accordance with state law
in civil actions and proceedings."
The Supreme Court has
asserted that "Congress manifested an affirmative intention not
to freeze the law of privilege" when it enacted Rule 501. 95 The
Supreme Court also recognized that the purpose behind Rule 501
"was to 'provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of
privilege on a case-by-case basis.' "' The Court further
acknowledged that privileges should be strictly construed due to
the important purpose securing evidence serves in the
administration of justice.97
Recently, in Jaffee v. Redmond," the Supreme Court held
that
confidential
communications
between
licensed
psychotherapists and their patients were privileged under
Federal Rule 501." The Court's decision in Jaffee is important in
the parent-child context because the Court utilized its authority
under Rule 501 to create new privileges where sufficiently
important interests outweigh the public's need for probative
evidence."°
The Court recognized the important private
interests underlying the psychotherapist privilege in stating that
"[elffective psychotherapy.., depends upon an atmosphere of
confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a
9 FED. R. EVID. 501 (1997).
94 See
id.

96

Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980). The Court modified the

broad spousal privilege under the Hawkins rule, so that only the witness-spouse
could invoke it. See id. at 53. The Court was careful to note that confidential
communications between spouses are always protected. See ic. at 51.
Id. at 47 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)).
97 See id. at 50 (stating that privileges "must be strictly construed
and accepted
'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding
relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth'") (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfuter, J., dissenting)); see also supra
note 65-66, 76, infra note 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
government interest in obtaining evidence.
98 518 U.S. 1 (1996).

See id. at 15 (adding that these confidential communications are privileged
insofar as they relate to the patient's diagnosis or treatment).
'00 See id. at 9 (citing Trammel, 455 U.S. at 50 and Elkins, 364 U.S. at 234).
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frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and
fears."' 0
Recently, the House of Representatives proposed a bill to
amend Federal Rule 501 to explicitly create a parent-child
testimonial privilege."° The bill provides that "[a] witness may
not be compelled to disclose the content of a confidential
communication with a child or parent of the witness.""° The bill
further provides that the principles that currently apply to the
spousal privilege should also apply to the parent-child
privilege."° Proponents of the bill argue that unless the privilege
is adopted, families will be destroyed because children will not
confide in their parents.' 5 Opponents argue that the refusal of
the majority of the federal and state courts to adopt the privilege
should be respected."~ In addition, opponents believe that the
scope of the proposed privilege is overbroad."
Most courts recognize their authority to create a new parentchild privilege under Federal Rule 501."° Only two federal
courts, however, have been brave enough to find a parent-child
privilege against the majority view."° The majority of cases that
'o1 Id. at 10.
102

See H.R 522, 106th Cong. (1999). A similar bill was introduced in the Senate

in 1998. See S. 1712, 105th Cong. (1998). That bill limited the privilege power to
cases not involving drug dealing, but it never got past the judiciary committee. See
id.
103 144 CONG. REC. H2268 (daily ed.
Apr. 23, 1998).
104 See id. (referring to common law principles as interpreted by the courts).
105 See id.
at H2268-69, H2271 (statements of Reps. Lofgren, Nadler, and
Jackson-Lee) (stressing the importance of children confiding in parents and arguing
for protection of such confidences).
106 See id. at H-2269 (statement of Rep. Coble).
'07 See id.
at H2269-71 (statements of Reps. Coble, Frank, and Hyde). Mr.
Coble suggested that a privilege protecting only minor children would be
inappropriate. See id. at H2269.
1
See United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Rule 501 but noting that this case did not warrant finding a parent-child privilege
because the father was abusing his children); In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1149
(3d Cir. 1997), cert denied, Roe v. United States, 520 U.S. 1253 (1997) (declining to
use this authority to create such a privilege); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John
Doe), 842 F.2d 244, 245-48 (10th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Ismail, 756
F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985) (asserting that "this power must be used sparingly");
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Unemancipated Minor Child), 949 F. Supp. 1487,
1493-94 (E.D. Wash. 1996) (describing additional principals other than those in
Rule 501 that should be considered when deciding whether there is a privilege); In
re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983) ( [T]his court is free to extend
present law to deal with those situations encountered in which constitutional
protection is deemed essential.").
109 See Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1325 (holding that there was a parent-child
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have declined to recognize the parent-child privilege under Rule
501 have relied on the narrow view of Trammel v. United
States."' Generally, the federal courts have argued two theories:
(1) that there was not a common law parent-child privilege,'
privilege protecting confidential conversations that further protected the child from
being forced to testify); In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R Evid.
Serv. 579, 589 (D. Conn. 1982) (determining that the "parent-child privilege is
available to [a mother] though only insofar as it rests on her religious conviction
that she cannot testify against her daughter willingly or under legal compulsion");
see also Grand Jury Proceedings (Unemancipated Minor Child), 949 F. Supp. at
1494 (recognizing the privilege as valid under federal law). For examples of courts
which have refused to adopt the privilege see Dunford, 148 F.3d at 391 (holding that
the circumstances of the case did not warrant the recognition of the privilege);
Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1146-57 (rejecting the parent-child privilege on various
grounds); In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to recognize the
privilege in the case of an emancipated adult child); United States v. Harris, No. 875840, 1988 WL 74154, at *2 (6th Cir. July 19, 1988) ("A parent-child privilege did
not exist at common law and this circuit has not recognized such a privilege.");
Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe), 842 F.2d at 249 (upholding contempt order
against a 15 year old who refused to testify against his mother); United States v.
Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the application of the parentchild privilege to criminal cases); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 436 (5th Cir. 1985)
(upholding a contempt sanctions against parents who refused to testify against their
son); Ismail, 756 F.2d at 1258 (refusing to recognize privilege in the case of an
emancipated adult); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Santarelli), 740 F.2d 816, 817
(11th Cir. 1984) (upholding contempt charge against son who refused to testify
against his father); United States v. (Under Seal), 714 F.2d 347, 349 n.4 (4th Cir.
1983) (declining to recognize the parent-child privilege); In re Matthews, 714 F.2d
223, 225 (2d Cir. 1983) (refusing to apply privilege to protect communications
between son-in-law and his in-laws); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817, 819 (4th
Cir. 1982) (refusing to recognize a privilege where a son's testimony against his
father did not involve their relationship or any conversation between them); United
States ex rel. Riley v. Franzen, 653 F.2d 1153, 1160 (7th Cir. 1981) (recognizing the
reluctance of the courts to adopt the parent-child privilege); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Starr), 647 F.2d 511, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1981) (declining to create a
privilege which would bar child's testimony against her mother and stepfather);
United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 1980) (declining to create parentchild privilege); In re Three Children, 24 F. Supp.2d 389, 390 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating
"it is well-settled that here there is no general parent-child testimonial privilege');
United States v. Duran, 884 F. Supp. 537, 541 (D.D.C. 1995) (determining that a
father's letter to his son was admissible because "[tihe general rule in most federal
courts is that there is no parent-child privilege"); In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (stating that there is "no such thing" as a parent-child privilege).
"0 445 U.S. 40 (1980). See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Trammel.
...See Erato, 2 F.3d at 16 (stating that "there is no privilege, other than the
spousal privilege, permitting a person not to testify against family members"); Penn,
647 F.2d at 885 (stating that a family privilege does not exist); Harris, 1988 WL
74154, at *2 (noting that there was no common law parent-child privilege); Ismail,
756 F.2d at 1258 (same); Grand Jury Subpoena (Santarelli),740 F.2d at 817 (same);
Matthews, 714 F.2d at 224 (noting that the only privilege protecting someone from
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and (2) that Trammel narrowed the scope of the spousal
privilege by proclaiming that privileges should be strictly
112
construed because of the importance of obtaining evidence.
The court in In re Agosto,"3 however, recognized the parent-child

privilege and asserted that Rule 501 should be liberally
construed based on its legislative history.11
It is significant that a few pre-Jaffee federal courts have
declined to adopt the parent-child testimonial privilege on the
facts of the cases directly before them."5 For example, the
Second Circuit, in In re Erato,"6 stated that "[alt least in [a case
involving a minor child] the argument would be available that
compelling a parent to inculpate a minor child risks a strain on
the family relationship that might impair the mother's ability to
provide parental guidance during the child's formative years. ""'
The Fourth Circuit has also acknowledged that a parent-child
privilege may be applicable in the case of an unemancipated
minor child."8 In addition, the Sixth Circuit refused to "address
situations involving... unemancipated minors who generally
testifying against a family member is the spousal privilege); Grand Jury
Proceedings (Starr), 647 F.2d at 512-13 (rejecting the parent-child privilege);
Duran, 884 F. Supp. at 541 (explaining that a parent-child privilege is nonexistent).
112 See Grand Jury Proceedings(John Doe), 842 F.2d at 245-46 (describing the
effect of Trammel and stressing the importance of obtaining evidence); Davies, 768
F.2d at 898 (same); Ismail, 756 F.2d at 1258 (same); Grand Jury Subpoena
(Santarelli),740 F.2d at 817 (explaining the need to gather evidence); (Under Seal),
714 F.2d at 349 n.4 (noting that witnesses can be forced to testify against family
members); Jones, 683 F.2d at 818-19 (discussing Trammel); see also supra notes 6566, 76, 100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the government's interest in
obtaining evidence.
1
553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983).
11 See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re
Agosto.
"' See Erato, 2 F.3d at 16 (deciding a parent-child privilege did not exist based
on the facts of the case); Harris,1988 WL 74154, at *2 (explaining that if a parentchild privilege existed it would be based on the spousal privilege, and the
circumstances here were such that the father could not use it, because his son did
not obtain the information at issue through a confidential communication); Ismail,
756 F.2d at 1258 (limiting its holding to emancipated adults); Jones, 683 F.2d at 819
(finding an emancipated adult child's testimony is not privileged under the
circumstances); see also infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Aqosto.
2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993).
117Id. at 16.
See Jones, 683 F.2d at 819 (noting that under different facts such a privilege
might apply).
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require much greater parental guidance and support."1 19
The majority of the cases which declined to recognize the
parent-child privilege were decided before Jaffee.2 ' In the two
years since Jaffee, two of the three federal courts that addressed
the issue indicated that they might be willing to recognize a
parent-child testimonial privilege if the facts warranted
recognition. 12 In United States v. Dunford," the Fourth Circuit
admitted in dicta that "Itihere may be much to commend a
testimonial privilege in connection with the testimony of or
against a minor child to preserve the family unit which is so
much under stress in today's society."" Although the privilege
has not been adopted by the Fourth Circuit, the court suggested
a "narrowly defined" privilege would be warranted under certain
circumstances.' 2' The court in Dunford, however, decided that
such a privilege was not appropriate where a father was abusing
his children and the privilege would not serve to protect "the
beneficial family unit that history has celebrated.""
In In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Unemancipated Minor Child),'2' a
federal district court stated that "reason and experience, as well
as the public interest, are best served by the recognition of some
form of a parent-child privilege. " 127 The court ultimately did not
allow the use of the parent-child privilege because the child had
not made a sufficient factual showing." Since Jaffee, it appears
that federal courts are not as adamant as they once were against
recognizing the parent-child privilege.
19 Ismail, 756 F.2d at 1258.

"0 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of Jaffee and
supra note 109 for cases declining to create a parent-child privilege.
121 See United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1998) (declining to
recognize the privilege because the defendant was charged with risking his
children's safety); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Unemancipated Minor Child), 949
F. Supp. 1487, 1497 (E.D. Wash. 1996) (declining to apply the privilege because
there was no evidence that the communications made were "intended to be
confidential" or that the testimony would harm the parent's interests).
122 148 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 1998).
1'2 Id. at 391.
124 Id.
The court indicated the proposed privilege's limits would exclude
situations in which "the family fractures itself or the child waives the privilege or
where ongoing criminal activity would be shielded by assertion of the privilege." Id.
125 id.
126 949 F. Supp 1487 (E.D. Wash. 1996).
117 Id. at 1497.
128 See id. The court was looking for proof that would have been sufficient for
the "marital communications privilege" or the "adverse spousal testimony privilege."
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The policy reasons and analogies used to support the
creation of other new privileges also support the adoption of a
parent-child privilege. The Supreme Court, in Jaffee, analogized
the new psychotherapist-patient privilege to the spousal and
attorney-client privileges by claiming that all are" 'rooted in the
imperative need for confidence and trust.' "'

The parent-child

privilege can be similarly analogized.'
In comparing a parentchild privilege to the spousal, priest-penitent,
and
psychotherapist privileges, the court in In re Grand Jury
Proceeding (UnemancipatedMinor) stated that "[uin this Court's
experience-as a judge, parent, child, and spouse-there is no
meaningful distinction between the policy reasons behind the
marital communications privilege and those behind a parentchild privilege."'
Further, and more importantly, "Itihe same
needs that are met by confessing to a priest, divulging fears and
wrongdoing to a psychotherapist, or confiding in a spouse are
present-and should be encouraged to be fulfilled-in the
context of parent-child relationships."'32
The Third Circuit is the only federal court that expressly
declined to recognize the parent-child privilege in the wake of
9 the Third Circuit articulated
Jaffee."3' In In re Grand Jury,'"
several arguments militating against the adoption of a parentchild privilege. The court found the following rationales
convincing: (1) the majority of courts which had addressed the
issue declined to find the privilege; (2) an analysis of Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 does not support recognition of the
129
30

Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51).
See Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1161-62 (3d Cir. 1997), cert denied, Roe v.

United States, 520 U.S. 1253 (1997) (Mansmann, J., concurring and dissenting)
(asserting that protecting the parent-child relationship is as compelling as and
analogous to the spousal privilege); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1258
(6th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[a]nalogous to the spousal privilege, the parent-child
privilege purportedly would serve the public interest in preserving the harmony and
confidentiality of the parent-child relationship"); In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298,
1325 (D. Nev. 1983) (asserting that the parent-child privilege is analogous to both
the spousal privilege "which is based upon love and affection" and the
psychotherapist privilege "which is based upon [ I guidance and [a]'listening ear' ");
see also 144 CONG. REC. H2269 (Apr. 23, 1998) (statement of Rep. Lofgren)
(asserting that the relationship between a parent and a child is "as precious as that
between husband and wife").
's' In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Unemancipated Minor Child), 949 F. Supp.
1487, 1494 (E.D. Wash. 1996).
1
1
134

Id.

See Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1140.
See id. at 1146.
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privilege; (3) the privilege would not protect the familial
relationship nor serve any social policy; and (4) the creation of a
privilege should be left to Congress."s In reviewing Jaffee, the
Third Circuit found the Supreme Court had "relied on the fact
that all fifty states had enacted some form of a psychotherapist
a
to recognize
privilege" in justifying its decision
In the present case,
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 13 6
however, no state within the Third Circuit had statutorily
adopted the parent-child privilege." 7 Moreover, the court found
that "confidentiality-in the form of a testimonial privilege-is
not essential to a successful parent-child relationship.""s In the
court's view, the "truth-seeking function of the judicial system"
outweighed the interest in a confidential parent-child
relationship."'
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Mansmann recognized the
reluctance of the majority to create a new privilege haphazardly
and yet posited "that where compelled testimony by a parent
concerns confidential statements made to the parent by his child
in the course of seeking parental advice and guidance, it is time
to chart a new legal course." " According to Judge Mansmann,
the court should have exercised its authority under Federal Rule
501 to develop privileges as deemed necessary and "recognize[d]
135

See id. at 1146-47. The strongest argument advanced by the majority was

that recognition of the parent-child privilege should be left to Congress. See id. at
1154-57. According to the court, the legislative branch is better equipped to
evaluate the public policy considerations involved in the creation of a new privilege.
See id. at 1154. However, in reaching this conclusion, the court failed to recognize
the legislature's intent for the judicial branch to take the lead in the creation of
privileges. See id. at 1159 (Mansmann, J., concurring & dissenting) "Congress...
crafted Rule 501 in order to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules
of privilege'.... It was Congress' intent 'to leave the door open to change.' "Id. at
1159 (citing Trammel u. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
Id. at 1150 ("The Jaffee Court explained that 'it is appropriate to treat a
consistent body of policy determinations by state legislatures as reflecting both
'reason' and 'experience.' '") (quoting Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13). See, e.g., Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371, 376-81 (1933).
'31 See GrandJury, 103 F.3d at 1150.
138 Id. at 1152. Unlike penitents, clients, or patients, children would probably
not "be aware of the existence... of a testimonial privilege covering parent-child
communications." Id. Therefore, according to the court, it is not clear whether a
guarantee of confidentiality would encourage children to seek guidance from their
parents. See id.
'39 Id. at 1153; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text for a more detailed
discussion of the argument that the search for truth will be affected by the privilege.
GrandJury, 103 F.3d at 1158.
'4
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a limited privilege.""' Moreover, the dissent correctly asserted
that "the protection of strong and trusting parent-child
relationships, outweighs the government's interest in
disclosure."
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although this Note has touched briefly on some of the
constitutional considerations involved in the recognition of the
parent-child privilege,"4 this section will more clearly articulate
the constitutional arguments that arise in this context.
Proponents of the parent-child privilege rely on both privacy and
free exercise principles in support of the privilege.'"
The analysis utilized in support of the Supreme Court's
recognition of a familial right to privacy also supports the
creation of the parent-child privilege." 5 For example, in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland,'" the Court stated that "[olur decisions
establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition." 47
141Id.
142 Id.

Just as the right to

Judge Mansmann asserted:

An effective parent-child relationship is one deserving of protection. It
rests upon a relationship of mutual trust where the child has the right to
expect that the parent will act in accordance with the child's best interest.
If the state is permitted to interfere in that relationship by compelling
parents to divulge information conveyed to them in confidence by their
children, mutual trust, and ultimately the family, are threatened.
Id. at 1160.
'4 See supra notes 36-37, 66-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of
constitutional considerations addressed by the various state courts.
'" See, e.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1310-12 (D. Nev. 1983) (discussing
the parent-child privilege in light of the familial right to privacy); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 579, 584 (D. Conn. 1982)
(discussing the parent-child privilege in fight of the free exercise of religion).
'" See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)
(stressing the importance of the family relationship); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972) (noting the Court's recognition of the importance of family and
stating the family is protected by the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Ninth Amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86
(1965) (reaffirming constitutional right to privacy theory and including familial
relationships and decisions within that right); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (recognizing "the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (defending a
parent's right to decide how to raise and educate his or her children free from state
interference); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (same).
1 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
147 Id. at 503.
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privacy protects the family as an institution, so does the parentchild privilege which would protect confidences shared within
the familial institution.
The court in In re Agosto' 8 recognized that the family unit
would be adequately protected by the creation of a parent-child
The court stated that although the
testimonial privilege.
government has an important interest in gathering evidence,
"this goal does not outweigh an individual's right of privacy in
his communications within the family unit, nor does it outweigh
the family's interests in its integrity and inviolability, which
spring from the rights of privacy inherent in the family
relationship itself."" 9 The court also asserted that the interests
of society would be jeopardized by forcing children to testify
against their parents,
since this would destroy the structure of
150
the family unit.
As logical as the constitutional guarantee of privacy appears
to be in the context of the parent-child privilege, the majority of
courts that have addressed the privacy argument in this context
have rejected it. 5 ' These courts summarily assert that the
privacy interest in a parent-child
privilege is not fundamental
5
1
protection.
warrant
to
enough
'
1

553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983).
Id. at 1325; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Unemancipated Minor

Child), 949 F. Supp. 1487, 1496 (E.D. Wash. 1996) (recognizing importance of
parent-child relationship); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 889-90 (9th Cir.
1980) (Fletcher, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980) (asserting that the
parent-child relationship should be protected by the Constitution).
150 See Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1326.
...See Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe) v. United States, 842 F.2d 244, 246
(10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that the Fifth Circuit has held that "the [parent-child]
privilege is not fundamental enough to afford it constitutional protection on privacy
grounds"); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1985), (refusing to
create a new privilege in light of the narrowness of privileges under Trammel); Port
v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 428-30 (5th Cir. 1985) (asserting the parent-child privilege
is not fundamental enough to be protected by the right to privacy).
152 See Port, 764 F.2d at 428-29 (determining that the right of privacy does not
create a constitutional right against child-incrimination). But see In re Agosto, 553
F. Supp. 1298, 1325-26 (D. Nev. 1983) (viewing family relationships as worthy of
strong constitutional protection and advocating the parent-child testimonial
privilege based on that ideal); In re A and M, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378-79 (4th Dep't
1978) (discussing the right of privacy and asserting that the constitution does confer
this right upon the family unit thus allowing a parent-child privilege to be invoked
although it is not statutorily protected). For examples of courts that have declined to
recognize the privilege based on common law ground see In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(Santarelli), 740 F.2d 816, 817 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding no parent-child privilege
under Federal Rule of Evidence 501); Matthews v. United States, 714 F.2d 223,
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In addition to the privacy arguments, free exercise
principles have been proposed in support of the parent-child
privilege. In In re Greenberg,' 3 the district court recognized a
limited parent-child privilege based on the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment. The court noted that the Jewish
religion does not allow parents to testify against their children.'"
The court held that "the grand jury's particular interest in
obtaining testimony... does not outweigh Mrs. Greenberg's
First Amendment interests" in religious freedom.' "
Since
Greenberg, however, litigants have argued unsuccessfully that to
be compelled to testify against one's parent would unjustifiably
impinge on their religious beliefs.'" For example, In In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (John Doe),157 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged
that freedom of religion is a fundamental right, but recognized
that the right to the free exercise thereof is not absolute.' The
court held that the "First Amendment privileges asserted here
are outweighed by the government's interests in investigating
crimes and enforcing the criminal laws of the United States."'59
Perhaps these courts forget that "a consequence of nearly all the
protections of the Bill of Rights" is the possibility that law
enforcement efforts may be hindered, yet that is "a consequence
that was originally and ever since deemed justified by the need
to protect individual rights."160

224-25 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding no privilege to testify against in-laws); see also Grand
Jury Proceeding(JohnDoe), 842 F.2d at 246 (citing Port for the proposition that the
Supreme Court has recognized familial rights of privacy as "fundamental" but has
excluded the parent-child testimonial privilege from the list of such rights).
'53 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 579, 584 (D. Conn. 1982) (stating the mother would
"be allowed to raise her religiously-based parent-child privilege" when testifying
against her daughter's interest). The court refused to create a common law parentchildprivilege. See id. at 587.
1 See id. at 582.
"
Id. at 584. The court, however, did state that "[in general... the interest of
the grand jury in obtaining testimony must prevail over a witness's First
Amendment religious rights." Id. at 583.
"5 For examples of unsuccessful free exercise arguments, see Grand Jury
Proceedings (John Doe), 842 F.2d at 247 (asserting that testifying would violate
Free Exercise Clause); Port, 764 F.2d at 431-32 (asserting that Judaism prohibits
parents from testifying against their son); In re Three Children, 24 F. Supp. 2d 389,
389-90 (D.N.J. 1998) (asserting that testifying against parents is prohibited by
Jewish faith); Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1300-01 (claiming that the Catholic faith
requires that he "honor this] father and mother" and thus he should not testify).
'5
842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1988).
18 See id. at 247.
1
Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
160 In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (D. Conn. 1972).
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CONCLUSION

Courts must remember that a healthy family life is the most
important thing to a child. The family institution is essential to
the preservation of our society. The law protects confidences
that are made in the spousal, attorney-client, priest-penitent,
and psychotherapist-patient relationships. The parent-child
relationship deserves the same protection. Children should be
able to confide in their parents without fear that someday these
confidences will be used against them.
The Constitution,
Federal Rules of Evidence, and society's goals support the
creation of a parent-child privilege so that a child's confidences
will be protected.
Maureen P. O'Sullivan
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